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Abstract
This article examines the political economy of selective immigration policy in a model
where decision makers are uncertain about the characteristics of migrants. The analysis
focuses on two questions: first, how does a selective immigration policy affect the
number of immigrants who are admitted by the receiving country; second, how does
a selective immigration policy in one country affect immigration policies in other coun-
tries. We find (i) that countries with selective immigration policies ceteris paribus tend to
admit more migrants than countries without such policies, and (ii) that neighbouring
countries will follow each other in implementing selective immigration policies, i.e.
there is diffusion. These theoretical findings are supported by evidence from an econo-
metric panel analysis of immigration policies in 15 Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries in the period from 1980 to 2005.
Keywords
immigration regulation, incomplete information, international migration, policy diffu-
sion, political economy of migration, screening, skill-selective immigration policies
Introduction
While the structure and patterns of international migration in Europe and other
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, as
well as the eﬀects of immigration policies on these patterns, are relatively well
understood (e.g. Appleyard, 2001; Bertoli et al., 2009; Freeman, 2006; Hooghe
et al., 2008; Neumayer, 2004; Venturini, 2007), the emergence of immigration
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policies has received surprisingly little attention.1 This is particularly disturbing,
since standard economic models of international migration would predict that
immigration increases the aggregate income of natives in the receiving countries
(e.g. Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2005; Dixit and Norman, 1980; Wong, 1995). Hence,
nations should not be expected to limit the inﬂow of people. Obviously, reality
contradicts such theory.
There are several available explanations to resolve this contradiction. First, the
gains from migration are all but equally distributed: production factors which are
substitutes for migrant labour lose, while production factors which are comple-
ments tend to win. The beneﬁts and losses from migration therefore depend on
the skill level and wealth of individuals. In real economies, the economic eﬀects
of migration essentially depend on labour market institutions. Models which
consider wage rigidities and unemployment show that immigration can also
result in an aggregate loss for the native population (e.g. Boeri and Bru¨cker,
2005). This is particularly relevant in the European context with periodically
widespread unemployment. Second, migration has an ambiguous impact on the
welfare state; while migrants on average pay fewer taxes and are more than
proportionally aﬀected by unemployment, the payments of migrants to pension
schemes exceed the returns. Moreover, against the background of demographic
change, they increase the workforce and mitigate age dependency rates. The
impact of migration on the ﬁscal balance of the welfare state is therefore ambig-
uous (e.g. Boeri et al., 2002; Bonin et al., 2000). Finally, native welfare is also
aﬀected by the social integration of migrants. Criminality, ethnic and cultural
diﬀerences, or simply xenophobia have, beyond economic aspects, an important
impact on the perception of migration for diﬀerent groups of the population. In
all three dimensions from above – namely, integration into the labour market,
integration into the welfare state and social integration – the eﬀects of migration
essentially depend on the human capital characteristics of migrants. The beneﬁt–
cost ratio tends to increase with education levels of migrants and other favour-
able human capital characteristics.
Hence, the political acceptance of migration is shaped by the composition of the
migrant population. During the 1990s and 2000s we can observe an increasing
resentment against further immigration in many OECD countries. New single-
platform parties with an anti-migration agenda such as the Freedom Party in the
Netherlands, the National Front in France, the Freedom Party and the Alliance for
the Future in Austria and the Danish People’s Party have successfully changed the
political landscape, particularly in Europe. Furthermore, real or perceived security
concerns, such as the war against terrorism, also shape popular opinion and
accordingly migration policy (Dover, 2008). Thus, many ruling policy makers in
immigration countries ﬁnd themselves in a tension between the potential economic
beneﬁts of migration and popular resentment, which can drive them out of oﬃce if
immigration creates too many problems. The answer to this policy dilemma has
been a screening of migrants, permitting good migrants in, while keeping bad ones
out. The screening of migrants has a long tradition in traditional immigration
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countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, the
United States (US), but is more and more being copied by other OECD countries,
such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the Czech Republic (see Bertoli et al., 2009;
Facchini et al. 2008). More recently, the Bluecard initiative by the European
Commission has tried to tackle the same problem. Although there are many dif-
ferences between the immigration policies in all these countries, they all grant
residence and work permits on the basis of education, language skills and other
human capital criteria, which should help to draw migrants which yield a net gain
for the receiving country.
The objective of this article is to examine some of the fundamental mechanics of
selective immigration policies. We address two main questions: ﬁrst, whether
screening aﬀects the number of migrants which are admitted by the country of
destination; second, whether the decision to opt for screening in one country has an
impact on immigration policies in countries which are close substitutes as destina-
tions for immigrants, e.g. neighbouring countries or countries which have similar
characteristics such as language. Opting for screening in one country might trigger
countries which are close substitutes as destinations to opt for screening as well.
The issue of regulation contagion is particularly important in the European Union
(EU), where currently 27 member states run and administer separate and largely
diverging immigration policy schemes, even though there may be a substantial
overlap in policy objectives (Koﬀ, 2005). Since an increasing share of the EU
immigrants originate from non-EU countries, the question of coordinating immi-
gration policies is high on the agenda of the EU Commission and the member
states.
The current article relates and contributes to two strands of literature. On the
one hand, and most obviously, our contribution adds to the political economy of
migration and the empirics of skill-selective immigration policies. A substantial
literature has meanwhile examined how individual preferences and interest
groups aﬀect immigration policies (Facchini and Mayda, 2008, 2009;
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Mayda, 2006), how immigration policies aﬀect
the skill structure of migration patterns (e.g. Belot and Hatton, 2008; Bertoli
et al., 2009; Bru¨cker and Defoort, 2009; Freemann, 1992, 1995; Grogger and
Hanson, 2008; Hooghe et al., 2008, Ortega and Peri, 2009) and how the skill
composition of the immigrant population impacts labour markets and the welfare
state (e.g. Boeri and Bru¨cker, 2005; Boeri et al., 2002; Razin et al., 2009). In con-
trast to this literature, which examines domestic channels through which immigra-
tion may aﬀect policy outcomes and vice versa, we adopt a broader perspective. We
consider how policy spillovers from other countries aﬀect national immigration
policies. In our view, this question becomes increasingly relevant since more and
more countries are tending to adopt skill-selective immigration policies, which may
in turn exert pressure on countries which do not. On the other hand, we contribute
to the literature on policy diﬀusion (e.g. Kato, 2003; Shipan and Volden, 2006,
2008; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Volden et al., 2008), which, to the best of our
knowledge, has largely ignored the impact of policy spillovers between competing
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destinations of immigrants so far.2 Moreover, our empirical methodological
approach is in line with recent recommendations in the literature, see Neumayer
and Plu¨mper (2010). Finally, even though the policy diﬀusion literature tradition-
ally used the term ‘policy diﬀusion’ we follow the recent trend and use the terms
policy contagion, policy diﬀusion or policy spillovers interchangeably. Still, on the
same note, our article relates to the conceptual framework of Simmons and Elkins
(2004) where policy diﬀusion stems from two primary forces: the force of example
and the force of aﬀecting the beneﬁts of others. The mechanism studied in our
article works via altering the beneﬁts of neighbouring economies and hence we
think the term contagion is rather appropriate.
The simple model we present in this article is not about the self-selection of
migrants or the migration decision of individual agents (see Bru¨cker and Schro¨der,
2011). This article is instead about the eﬀects that the eﬀorts by one host country to
improve the beneﬁts of migration have on other destination countries. To simplify
issues, we treat the pool of potential migrants as given. The channel we highlight is
that screening by one destination country alters the composition of the remaining
migrant pool available to other (second mover) countries. Most importantly the
actualmigrant type is not directly observable for the administration in the destination
country. Screening, testing, the allocation of points, etc., only give imperfect infor-
mation on the true type of the migrant. Thus, immigration countries act under the
constraint of imperfect information on the migrants’ true characteristics.
We test two hypotheses that are derived from our theoretical considerations.
Namely, whether countries which pursue a selective immigration policy admit
more migrants than other countries, and whether the fact that a country employs
a selective immigration policy increases the probability that a neighbouring country
follows the same approach, i.e. whether we can observe clusters of countries with a
selective immigration policy. For this purpose, we use a new panel data set which
covers migration ﬂows into 15 OECD countries from 1980 to 2005. This data set is
complemented by data on immigration policies collected by Mayda and Patel (2004),
which has been adjusted and extended for our analysis. Based on these data, we ﬁnd
robust evidence that (i) skill-selective immigration policies are correlated with larger
immigration ﬂows and that (ii) skill-selective immigration policies are correlated
across countries which are close substitutes as destinations for migrants.
Framework of analysis
Consider two countries, 1 and 2, which face a pool of n potential migrants from the
rest of the world, where n is normalized to 1. Furthermore, assume that a of these
potential migrants are undesirable migrants, b for bad, from the perspective of the
two potential host countries, in the sense that they are unemployable, religious
fanatics, criminal, welfare seekers or all of the above. Meanwhile (1a) of the
potential migrants are good migrants, g, in the sense that they generate a net-
beneﬁt for the receiving country and are thus desired migrants by both countries;
note a2 [0, 1] and where a is common knowledge. However, a speciﬁc migrant’s
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true type is unobservable to policy makers; only via some imperfect screening
technology agents can they be labelled such that
Prðlabel ¼ gjtype ¼ gÞ ¼ Prðlabel ¼ bjtype ¼ bÞ ¼ p, ð1Þ
where p is known to the policy maker and accordingly we consider only 14 p4 12.
Finally, assume that policy makers in both countries – for example, as driven by an
election game, political competition or other events in the background – can only
accept a maximum of ki migrants of type b, while they, driven by a generally
accepted net-beneﬁt from good migrants, want to maximize the total inﬂow, mi,g,
of g types. Formally, they choose the total number of in-migrants, m1 and m2, such
as to maximize:3
max
mi
mi,g s:t:mi,b  ki ; i ¼ 1, 2: ð2Þ
We have on purpose built the simplest of all frameworks to see what light it can
shed on the fundamental question of regulation contagion.4 Namely, under the
above conditions, what are the total number of migrants, m1 and m2, that each
country will be willing to admit? We will answer this question for three scenarios:
ﬁrst, no country administers a positive selection of migrants, i.e. no country uses
the screening technology, p; second, both countries apply the screening technology
and only admit migrants labelled as g types; third, country 1 screens, while country
2 does not screen and moves second.
Before conducting the analysis, it is instructive brieﬂy to highlight two central
limitations of this simple model. First, we have not included screening costs into the
above framework. Obviously, real-world selective migration polices impose admin-
istrative costs both on migrants and the destination country. For the policy maker
objective this would imply an additional constraint in (2), similar say to a resource
constraint, and none of the results of the model are aﬀected. For the migrant,
however, such screening costs would partly counterbalance the migration advan-
tages (such as higher expected income). Thus screening costs would alter the pool
of available migrants in a dynamic setting; however, for the static model examined
here no qualitative changes occur. Second, we impose symmetry on the two poten-
tial destination countries throughout. This applies both to the strategic action
space and to the pool of migrants. Only in their political constraints (e.g. ki) do
we allow the countries to diﬀer. A richer model would also separate the countries in
terms of the a priori pool of potential migrants (say the attractiveness of the des-
tination country). However, in order to focus on contagion eﬀects we omit these
aspects, having in mind that subsequent empirical testing controls for country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, which absorb all time-invariant factors aﬀecting the pool of
immigrants or the costs of sceening (e.g. geography and similar factors).
In the benchmark case, labelled A, where neither of the two countries applies a
screening technology, we have the following simple situation. Permitting an inﬂow
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of mi migrants results in ami bad migrants and accordingly, given the policy con-
straint, we have the maximizing migration choice of
mAi ¼
ki

; i ¼ 1, 2: ð3Þ
Next, consider a situation where both countries apply screening technology, p,
and allow only those agents labelled as g types to enter. In this case, denoted B, it
must be that (1 p)a agents of the true type bad have been incorrectly labelled as
good, while we have p(1 a) true good agents that have been correctly labelled as
good. So there will be a total of p(1 a)+ (1 p)a agents carrying the label good,
and accordingly the probability of getting a b-type agent is p0B ¼ ð1pÞpð1Þþð1pÞ, and
thus the permitted inﬂow of migrants in this case must be
mBi ¼
ki

pð1 Þ þ ð1 pÞ
1 p ; i ¼ 1, 2: ð4Þ
It is easy to verify that pð1Þþð1pÞ1p 4 1, and thus – as expected – with screening a
larger total inﬂow of migrants is permitted.
In the third – asymmetric – scenario, C, where only country 1 screens, while
country 2 does not screen and moves second, it must be that from the perspective of
country 1 this situation is identical to scenario B. Thus
mC1 ¼
k1

pð1 Þ þ ð1 pÞ
1 p : ð5Þ
In contrast, country 2 faces an altered mix of potential migrants which it permits to
enter at random. The composition of the remainder migrant pool features
ðmC1 p0BÞ b types and ð1 Þ mC1 ð1 p0BÞ g types. Or, put diﬀerently, since
country 1 by maximizing m1,g has drawn k1 bad migrants out of the pool and
has accepted a total of mC1 migrants, the probability of drawing a bad migrant
from the remainder pool must be
p00C ¼
 k1
1mC1
¼ ð1 pÞð k1Þð1 pÞ k1pð1 Þ  k1ð1 pÞ : ð6Þ
Accordingly, country 2 maximizes the inﬂow of good agents when setting the total
inﬂow of migrants at
mC2 ¼
k2

ð1 pÞ k1pð1 Þ  k1ð1 pÞ
ð1 pÞð k1Þ : ð7Þ
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Inspection of (7) and (3) discloses that mC2 5m
A
2 . Thus when country 1 applies a
screening technology, country 2 permits fewer total migrants. Since country 2 still
ends up with the same number of b-type agents it must arrive at a strictly lower
number of the beneﬁcial g types. Accordingly, country 2 must be worse oﬀ.
Two immediate policy conclusions can be made. First, the unilateral implemen-
tation of a screening procedure in country 1 increases the total permitted inﬂow of
migrants into country 1 and reduces the total permitted inﬂow of migrants into
country 2. Thus one observes a tightening of policy in country 2 following a green
card regulation in country 1. Second, the nearhand solution for country 2 is, of
course, also to implement a screening procedure, which would bring us to case B,
where both countries permit larger numbers of migrants and receive larger numbers
of the beneﬁcial g-type migrants.
Finally, the eﬀects of changes in the exogenous variables of the above model
lead to highly intuitive comparative static results. For example, it can be shown
that an improvement of the initial quality composition of the migrant pool, lower a
or an increase in tolerance levels, i.e. an increase in the policy constraints, k1 and k2,
or a better screening technology, p, lead ceteris paribus to the country in question
permitting larger total migrant inﬂows.
Empirical evidence
From this simple theoretical framework we can derive two hypotheses, which can
be falsiﬁed empirically. First, countries which pursue a selective immigration policy
admit more migrants than countries which do not – anything else being equal.
Second, if one country opts for a selective immigration policy, other countries
may follow this example. The latter hypothesis is expected to hold particularly
for countries in the same geographical region since international migration is
heavily concentrated regionally. However, due to falling transport and communi-
cation costs the role of distance is eroding over time. Countries which have similar
characteristics in terms of language, culture and economic opportunities might
therefore be considered as close substitutes from the perspective of potential
migrants. We therefore consider diﬀerent classiﬁcations for the substitution rela-
tionships below.
A detailed proof of both hypotheses is hardly possible at present, since only a
small number of countries follow selective immigration policies consistently (see
Bertoli et al., 2009; Chaloﬀ and Lemaitre, 2009; Mayda and Patel, 2004).
Moreover, the variance of immigration policies over time is relatively small.
Nevertheless, on the basis of the available data we provide some ﬁrst evidence.
The data set
Our analysis is based on annual gross immigration ﬂows into 15 OECD countries
in the period 1980 to 2005, which gives altogether 390 balanced panel observa-
tions.5 The migration data for the years 1995 to 2005 are taken from the
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International Migration Dataset (IMD) provided by the OECD (2009). For the
period 1980 to 1994 we used the data set collected and organized by Mayda (2007)
which is based on OECD data as well. Since the data sources and methods of
collection are the same, we merged these two data sources. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the approach, see also Mayda (2007) and Ortega and Peri (2009).
The immigration data are based on national population registers and residence
permits, which can be considered as relatively accurate measures for the legal entry
of foreign nationals. While the OECD makes an eﬀort (especially since 1995) to
maintain a consistent deﬁnition of immigrants across countries, some diﬀerences in
the deﬁnition of migrants across countries remain. An important one is that some
countries deﬁne immigrants on the basis of the place of birth and others on the
basis of nationality. While this inconsistency can make a pure cross-country com-
parison inaccurate, it is a less severe problem in our case of ﬁxed eﬀect regressions
where the within transformation controls for cross-country diﬀerences in measure-
ment – at least if these diﬀerences in deﬁnitions and measurement concepts are
time-invariant.
Categorizing skill-selective immigration policies is also diﬃcult, since in most
countries many channels of immigration exist which are then subject to many legal
and other regulatory changes over time. We base our analysis on major diﬀerences
in skill-selective immigration policies and major policy reforms in order to capture
the main eﬀects. For this purpose we use the Mayda and Patel (2004) data set
which has been updated by Ortega and Peri (2009). The Mayda and Patel (2004)
data set documents the main characteristics of immigration policies in several
OECD countries (between 1980 and 2000) and the year of changes in their legis-
lations. Ortega and Peri (2009) have updated this database to the year 2005.
Following the same methodological approach, we classiﬁed immigration policies
in New Zealand based on information provided by the home oﬃce (New Zealand
Home Oﬃce, 2010) and OECD (2003). In addition, we use information on major
policy reforms in selected countries presented in Bertoli et al. (2009) for cross-
checking the information from the other sources. Using this information, we cal-
culated an index of skill-selective immigration policies, which has a value from one
(no skill-selective immigration policies at all) to 10 (consistent skill-selective immi-
gration policies).
The index of skill-selective immigration policies is reported in Table A1 in the
supporting information. As can be seen there, the traditional immigration countries
Australia, New Zealand and Canada achieve the highest scores. In the beginning of
the sample period, these countries eﬀectively inﬂuenced the skill level of immigrants
by admitting only migrants from sending countries which are characterized by high
income levels and high human capital endowments, i.e. the Western European
countries, the US and Canada. Canada was the ﬁrst among these countries
which formally introduced a point-based system which regulated the entry of immi-
grants explicitly by human capital criteria such as education, occupation, age,
language proﬁciency and work experience in 1967. Similar systems were adopted
by Australia in 1989 and by New Zealand in 1991. These systems have been
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reformed over time in order to improve the human capital characteristics of immi-
grants and their labour market performance. The picture is more mixed in the US,
where many channels for entering the country exist. The most important reform to
improve the skill mix of the migrant population has been the adoption of the 1990
Immigration Act. This Immigration Act established the H1B visa category, which
explicitly opened a channel for the immigration of high skilled workers. However,
at some 65,000 visas per year the number of workers which immigrate under this
category is modest. Although many other channels exist which facilitate the immi-
gration of high skilled individuals in the US, the skill-selective immigration policies
are diluted inter alia by a large amount of illegal immigration. Still, immigration
policies are much more skill-selective in the US than in the European countries
covered by our sample. Many European countries do not yet have any skill-selec-
tive immigration policies in place or they have only conducted minor reforms such
as Germany (DE) during the Schro¨der government. The most comprehensive
reform in Europe was adopted by the UK, which overhauled the immigration
policies by introducing a point-based system.6
Considering a policy index instead of simple dummy variables has the main
advantage that we can exploit policy changes for our analysis, which provides a
much higher variance than simply including dummy variables. Although a
higher variance of immigration policies would improve the analysis, we obtain
a considerable variation in immigration polices both across and within countries
in our sample. We report this information in Table A1 of the supporting
information.
For analyzing policy spillovers, we have to decide which countries are close
substitutes as migration destinations and which are not. To ensure robustness of
results, we decided to include two diﬀerent measures for this purpose. The ﬁrst
measure is simply based on geographical neighbourhood, i.e. countries are consid-
ered as substitutes if they have a common border or, in the case of islands, are
characterized by geographical proximity. In addition to this criteria, our second
measure takes other characteristics into account, i.e. common language, culture,
etc. In this case, countries with English as the main native language (AUS, CA,
NZL, the UK and the US) form a cluster, as well as the Nordic countries (DK,
NOR, SWE). Based on these two measures, we calculate for the countries which
are considered as close substitutes a skill-selective immigration policy index, i.e. the
average policy of the group of substitute countries, where each country considered
as a substitute is weighted by its population size (see the supporting information,
which also contains the descriptive statistics for all variables considered in the
regressions (Tables A2 and A3)).
Based on considerations derived from gravity models which explain trade and
factor movements, we consider the real gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita and population size as control variables. Our source for the GDP per
capita variable is the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston et al., 2009) and for the
population ﬁgures the World Bank Development Indicators 2010 (World Bank,
2010).
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Does screening yield more migration?
The ﬁrst hypothesis states that countries which pursue skill-selective immigration
policies tend to admit more migrants than others do. We examine this in a simple
regression model which estimates the impact of our index for skill-selective immi-
gration policies on the gross migration rate. More speciﬁcally, the regression model
is speciﬁed as
mit ¼ 1Si,t1 þ 0xi,t1 þ eit, ð8Þ
where mit is the gross migration rate of destination country i, Si,t1 the index of
skill-selective immigration policies, which is scaled between one and 10, xi,t1 a
vector of control variables, g the corresponding vector of coeﬃcients and it the
disturbance term. a0 denotes the constant, a1 the parameter of interest, i (i¼ 1,
2,. . ., 15) is the destination country index and t (t¼ 1, 2,. . ., 25) the time index. We
thus explain the migration rate by the lagged index of skill-selective immigration
policies and the lagged values of the control variables. We have chosen lagged
values assuming that migrants form their expectations based on past values of
the relevant institutional and economic variables. Note that Blanchﬂower and
Oswald (2004) have shown that simple ordinary least squares (OLS) models achieve
similar results as ordered logit models already for three-point scales. Our skill-
selective immigration policy index is measured at a 10-point scale, and thus the
results of our OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects models can be expected to be suﬃciently
accurate.
The error term eit is speciﬁed as a two-way error component model with ﬁxed
country and ﬁxed time eﬀects, i.e. as
eit ¼  þ i þ t þ "it, ð9Þ
where y denotes a constant, i denotes a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, t a time-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect and eit  N(0, s2) is white noise. While the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects capture all time-invariant factors which aﬀect migration decisions such as
geographical distance, language and culture, the time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects control
for all time-varying factors which are common to all cross-sections in one time
period, such as joint macroeconomic shocks or transport and communication costs
which fall over time. We test stepwise for the signiﬁcance of the country-speciﬁc
and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
The other control variables are derived from the well-established gravity model
of trade and factor mobility. We consider here three variables as controls: GDP per
capita at purchasing power parities and constant prices, the population size of the
destination country and a deterministic time trend. The GDP per capita serves as
an approximation for expected earnings in the receiving country and should thus
aﬀect the scale of migration positively. We expect that population size aﬀects the
gross migration rate negatively since the migration rate is already normalized by
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the population of the destination country. The expected negative eﬀect follows
from the fact that larger countries tend to have lower shares of external trade
and factor mobility than smaller countries, other things being equal, since there
is more room for internal trade and factor mobility in larger countries. Further,
geographical distance and other time-invariant variables, which are relevant in
gravity equations, drop out since we consider country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our ﬁnal model is thus speciﬁed as
lnmit ¼ 1Si,t1 þ 2 ln yi,t1 þ 3 ln popi,t1 þ eit, ð10Þ
where ln yi,t1 is the log of the GDP per capita measured in purchasing power
parities and constant prices and ln popi,t1 is the log of the population in the
destination country.
As a robustness check, we estimate the model also in a dynamic form, i.e. as
lnmit ¼
XN
j¼1
jmi,tj þ 1Si,t1 þ 2 ln yi,t1 þ 3 ln popi,t1 þ eit, ð11Þ
where j indexes the time lag and gj the coeﬃcient on the lagged migration rate. The
number of lags is chosen based on the signiﬁcance level, i.e. we include all lags that
turn out signiﬁcant at least at the 10 percent level.
Table 1 presents the regression results. The ﬁrst regression is estimated by
pooled OLS, i.e. with a common constant ignoring country-speciﬁc and time-spe-
ciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the skill-selective
immigration policy index suggests that skill-selective immigration policies are pos-
itively correlated with a higher migration rate. As expected, the GDP per capita
level of the destination country aﬀects the migration rate positively, while the
population size variable exerts a negative eﬀect.
The ﬁrst regression is, however, biased and inconsistent if country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects aﬀect the migration behaviour of individuals. Regression (2) therefore
includes country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The F(14, 374)-test statistic is 93.10, which
rejects the Null hypothesis of no country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects at the 1 percent level.
The coeﬃcient on the indicator for skill-selective immigration policies still appears
positive and highly signiﬁcant. Similarly, as in the ﬁrst regression, we obtain the
expected positive sign for the coeﬃcient of the GDP variable and a negative sign
for the coeﬃcient of the population size variable. Note that also the scale of the
coeﬃcient for the skill-selective immigration policy variable is similar to the pooled
model in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model. The R2 suggests that our model explains about 40
percent of the within variation in our data.7
In regression (3) we consider not only country-speciﬁc but also time-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects which absorb the variance of shocks common to all cross-sections in
a time period. Including time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is a safe way to control for
omitted time-varying variables. The F(24, 348)-test statistic is 1.86, which rejects
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the Null hypothesis of no time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects at the 1 percent level. Moreover,
we use the Prais–Winston estimator which calculates panel-corrected standard
errors, i.e. standard errors which correct for panel-speciﬁc heteroscedasticity and
contemporaneous correlation. Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) provide Monte Carlo
evidence that the Prais–Winston estimator is preferable to Feasible Generalized
Least Square estimators in ﬁxed eﬀects regressions since the latter tends to under-
estimate the standard errors in panels which have a similar group and time dimen-
sion compared to ours. The Wald-test statistics suggest that panel-speciﬁc
heteroscedasticity is present in our data. As can be seen in Table 1, the coeﬃcient
on the index for skill-selective immigration policies is still positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. Again, we obtain the expected and signiﬁcant results for
the control variables. The R2 statistic indicates that the model considering
Table 1. Explaining the immigration rate (standard errors in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln mi,t1 0.862
***
(0.062)
ln mi,t2 -0.185
***
(0.062)
Si,t1 0.106
*** 0.114 *** 0.090 *** 0.040 **
(0.013) (0.025) (0.023) (0.017)
ln yi,t1 0.860
*** 1.937 *** 1.127 *** 0.400 **
(0.119) (0.156) (0.187) (0.133)
ln popi,t1 -0.347
*** -0.367 *** -3.977 *** -1.493 ***
(0.012) (0.540) (0.559) (0.392)
Constant -4.113 *** 16.745 *** 14.439 *** 5.754 ***
(1.269) (4.034) (2.784) (2.157)
Observations 390 390 390 375
Country-specific fixed effects no yes yes yes
Time-specific fixed effects no no yes yes
R2 0.54 0.39 0.48 0.78
Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. The dependent variable is
the log of the gross immigration rate, ln mit, in all regressions. Regression (1) is estimated by pooled OLS.
Regression (2) is estimated with country-specific fixed effects. The F(14, 357)-test statistic is 93.10, which
rejects the Null of no country-specific fixed effects at the 1 percent level. Regression (3) is estimated with
country- and time-specific fixed effects. The F(23, 333)-test statistic is 2.91, which rejects the Null of no time-
specific effects at the 1 percent level. Regression (4) is estimated with country- and time-specific fixed effects.
The F(23, 317)-test statistic is 1.62, which rejects the Null of no time-specific fixed effects at the 5 percent
level. We report panel corrected standard errors assuming panel specific heteroscedasticity of the standard
errors in regressions (3) and (4). In regression (3), the Wald-2(41) statistics for the model assuming
independent errors is 4.114, for the model assuming heteroscedastic errors is 7.202. In regression (4), the
Wald-2(42) statistics for the model assuming independent errors is 9.577 and for the model assuming
heteroscedastic errors it is 14.618.
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country-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects can explain 48 percent of the within
variance in our data.
Finally, in the fourth regression, we have speciﬁed the model in dynamic form
considering two lagged values of the dependent variable. We consider the ﬁrst and
the second lags of the dependent variable since further lags do not appear signif-
icant in our data. The model is estimated again with country- and time-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects, which both turn out signiﬁcant in our data. As before, we estimate the
model using the Prais–Winston procedure which enables us to calculate panel-
corrected standard errors. One might argue that simultaneous equation bias may
aﬀect the results of a dynamic model with ﬁxed eﬀects (Nickell, 1981). However,
this bias is of order 1/T, such that it is rather small in our case with 24 observations
over time. Monte Carlo evidence suggests that standard OLS estimators consider-
ing ﬁxed eﬀects are preferable to Generalized Methods of Moments estimators in a
panel of our cross-sectional and time dimension (Judson and Owen, 1999).
As can be seen in column 4 of Table 1, the short-term coeﬃcient on our skill-
selective immigration policy variable is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level and has a
value of 0.04. The long-term coeﬃcient.8 has a value of 0.12 and is thus comparable
to the values obtained for this variable in the static estimates of the model. For the
control variables we obtain again the expected signs and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
All together, we ﬁnd a robust correlation between skill-selective immigration
policies and the scale of migration. This holds both for the static speciﬁcation of the
model which considers country- and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and for the dynamic
model which considers lagged values of the dependent variable. Since we applied a
log–log speciﬁcation of the model, we can interpret the results as elasticities. With
respect to the variable of interest, the immigration policy index increasing the index
by one score increases the gross migration rate by between 9.0 percent and 11.4
percent in the static regressions. If the gross migration rate initially is 0.10, for
instance, then increasing the immigration policy index by one score raises the gross
migration rate to between 0.109 and 0.114. In the dynamic regression, increasing
the immigration policy index by one score increases the gross migration rate by 4
percent in the short run and by 12.4 percent in the long run. Altogether, the scale of
the coeﬃcient is remarkably stable across the diﬀerent regressions. However, since
the scores of the immigration policy index are a constructed measure the reader
should be aware that the quantitative results have to be taken with reservations and
considered carefully.
Note that the ﬁxed model identiﬁes the parameters via the within variation in the
data, i.e. via changes in the relevant policy variables holding time-invariant diﬀer-
ences across countries constant which may aﬀect the scale of migration in one way
or another. Similarly, the models considering also time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects absorb
the variance resulting from shocks common to all countries. Unobserved hetero-
geneity across countries or across time periods can thus not bias our results.
Nevertheless, although our ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis derived
from our theoretical model, we are reluctant to draw causal inference from our ﬁnd-
ings. A robust correlation between a high migration rate and lagged skill-selective
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immigration policies does not necessarily imply that skill-selective immigration
policies are the cause of a higher immigration rate. As a robustness check we
have also estimated the model with skill-selective immigration policies on the
left-hand side and the migration rate on the right-hand side (i.e. reverse causality),
but we obtained no signiﬁcant results for the migration rate in this speciﬁcation.
We thus conclude that our ﬁndings are a strong hint that skill-selective immigration
policies – other things being equal – trigger higher migration rather than the other
way round.
Do we observe migration regulation contagion?
Consider now the second hypothesis, i.e. that a selective immigration policy in one
country triggers other countries to follow the same approach. These spillover eﬀects
are of course more relevant for countries which are close substitutes as destination
countries. As outlined above, we use two indicators for substitution links between
countries. The ﬁrst one is simply based on geographical proximity
(SPILLOVER1i,t1). It assumes that immigration policies in one country are aﬀected
by immigration policies in countries with which it shares a common border or a
common coast. The second indicator is based both on common border or common
coast and on further criteria such as common language, culture and other links
between countries, which may result in substitution relations (SPILLOVER2i,t1).
For both indicatorswe compute the population-weighted average policy stance of the
group of substitute countries. Since spatial correlation might be an issue in our data,
we consider the ﬁrst lags of the explanatory variables in our regressions.
Empirically, we test the hypothesis that skill-selective immigration policies aﬀect
countries which are close substitutes as destinations for migrants by estimating the
following model:
Sit ¼ 	1SPILLOVERi,t1 þ 0xit þ uit, ð12Þ
where Sit denotes as before the index for skill-selective immigration policies,
SPILLOVERi,t1 a weighted index for the skill-selective immigration policies in
countries which are considered as close substitutes as destinations for migrants, xit
a vector of control variables and Z the related vector of coeﬃcients. The error term
uit is speciﬁed as before as a two-way error component model with ﬁxed country-
and time-speciﬁc eﬀects.
We thus explain skill-selective immigration policies by an index of skill-selective
immigration policies in countries considered as close substitutes as destinations for
migrants weighted by their population size and some control variables. Beyond the
country- and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, we use the GDP per capita as a control
variable, such that we estimate the model in static form as
Sit ¼ 	1SPILLOVERi,t1 þ 	2 ln yi,t1 þ uit: ð13Þ
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and in dynamic form as
Sit ¼
XN
j¼1
jSi,tj þ 	1SPILLOVERi,t1 þ 	2 ln yi,t1 þ uit: ð14Þ
We decided not to consider population size here since there is no obvious reason
why population size should aﬀect immigration policies.9 We estimated all regres-
sions using the ﬁrst and the second measures for policy spillovers.
Table 2 reports the regression results for the ﬁrst spillover indicator. We ﬁnd a
robust correlation between the regulation of immigration by human capital criteria
in one country and similar policies in neighbouring countries. In the pooled OLS
regressions – i.e. regression (1) in Table 2 – the coeﬃcient on the weighted index of
skill-selective migration policies in neighbouring countries is highly signiﬁcant and
at a value of 0.73 of considerable size. Note that we can interpret these coeﬃcients
only as linear correlations since both variables are indices. In the regressions with
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects the coeﬃcient on the index of skill-selective migration
policies in substitute countries is still signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and large. The
F(14,373)-test statistics of 229.6 indicates that the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are
jointly signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The regression diagnostics suggest that we
can explain 47 percent of the within variation of the data in regression.
In the regressions with country- and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects the coeﬃcient on
the variable of interest, the index of skill-selective immigration policies, is still
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level although the scale of the coeﬃcient declines relative
to the previous regressions. The F(24, 373)-test statistic is 1.86 in regression (2)
which suggests that the time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly signiﬁcant. Moreover,
we have used the Prais–Winston estimator in regressions (3) which enables us to
report panel-corrected standard errors which consider panel-speciﬁc heteroscedas-
ticity in the error terms. The Wald-2 statistics suggest that heteroscedasticity is
present in our data. The regression diagnostics indicate that we can explain about
50 percent of the within variation in regression (2).
Finally, we apply a dynamic speciﬁcation of our model in regression (4). We con-
sider only one lag of the dependent variable in the speciﬁcation presented in Table 2
since further lags have turned out to be insigniﬁcant. The short-term coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in regression (4). The long-run coeﬃcient10 is at 0.89
in regression (4) somewhat larger than in the static speciﬁcations of the model. The
F(24, 333)-test statistic for the speciﬁcation of the dynamic model with country- and
time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is 1.08, which cannot reject the Null hypothesis of no time-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. We therefore present the model which only considers country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Again we report panel-corrected standard errors which correct
for panel-speciﬁc heteroscedasticity. The regression diagnostics suggest that we can
explain 91 percent of the within variation of the data with the dynamic model.
The ﬁndings we obtain on the basis of the second spillover index (Table 3), i.e.
the weighted index of skill-selective immigration policies in countries which are
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considered as close substitutes, are remarkably similar to our ﬁrst ﬁndings, which
are based on the simple criteria of geographical neighbourhood. In the pooled OLS
model, the coeﬃcient for the variable of interest is at 0.99 somewhat larger than
that for the ﬁrst indicator and also signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Again, the
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects turn out to be highly signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the
skill-selective immigration policies in countries which are close substitutes is, how-
ever, at 1.11 substantially larger than that for the variable which is based on the
neighbourhood criteria (0.62) in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions. The time-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects turn out to be insigniﬁcant both in the static and the dynamic speciﬁcation
of the model. The long-run coeﬃcient in the dynamic speciﬁcation of the model is
at 1.66 again substantially larger than that of the other policy indicator (0.89). Note
again that these results refer to linear correlations which are hard to interpret
quantitatively since they depend on the scaling of the index variables.
Nevertheless, skill-selective immigration policies seem to be closely correlated
across clusters of countries, which supports the second theoretical prediction of our
model. In our broader deﬁnition of the substitution criteria, which beyond
Table 2. Explaining skill-selective immigration policies (1) (standard errors in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Si,t1 0.930
***
(0.030)
SPILLOVER1i,t1 0.733
*** 0.616 *** 0.494 *** 0.063 **
(0.038) (0.051) (0.049) (0.028)
ln yi,t1 -1.194
*** 0.624 *** -1.859 *** 0.128 *
(0.333) (0.205) (0.345) (0.067)
constant 13.177 *** -4.997 *** 21.890 *** -1.394 ***
(3.394) (-2.004) (3.651) (0.621)
Observations 390 390 390 375
Country-specific fixed effects no yes yes yes
Time-specific fixed effects no no yes no
R2 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.91
Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. The dependent variable is
the index of skill-selective immigration policies, Sit, in all regressions. Regression (1) is estimated by pooled
OLS. Regression (2) is estimated with country-specific fixed effects. The F(14, 373)-test statistic is 229.61***,
which rejects the Null of no country specific fixed effects at the 1 percent significance level. Regressions (3) is
estimated with country- and time-specific fixed effects. The F(24, 348)-test statistic is 1.86***, suggesting that
the time-specific fixed effects are significant at the 1 percent level. Regression (4) is estimated with country-
specific fixed effects but no time-specific fixed effects, since the F(24, 333)-test statistic of 1.09 indicates that
time-specific fixed effects are not significant here. We report panel corrected standard errors assuming panel
specific heteroscedasticity of the standard errors in regressions (3) and (4). In regression (3), the Wald-2(41)
statistics for the model assuming independent errors is 8.071 and for the model assuming heteroscedastic
errors it is 12.696. In regression (4), the Wald-2(17) statistics for the model assuming independent errors is
45.733 and for the model assuming heteroscedastic errors it is 67.977.
330 European Union Politics 12(3)
 at Inst Fuer Arbeitsmarkt-Und on September 10, 2013eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
geographical proximity also covers language and cultural links, we ﬁnd an even
stronger correlation. This is true for all speciﬁcations of the model, i.e. under
consideration of country- and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and in the dynamic speci-
ﬁcation of the model.
The high value of the correlation coeﬃcient can be traced back to the selective
immigration policies in neighbouring countries such as Australia and New
Zealand, and Canada and the US. The few European countries which pursue a
selective immigration policy at present have introduced these policies only some
years ago, hence the weight of those countries is not large in our sample. Our
results therefore only have a preliminary character. It would be possible to harvest
more insights on our hypothesis if further countries in Europe start to apply selec-
tive immigration policies. This would also us allow to consider country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects and use the variance in the time dimension for the identiﬁcation of
our parameters. Nevertheless, the large coeﬃcient and high signiﬁcance of the
parameter for selective immigration policies in neighbouring countries is a strong
hint that migration regulation contagion is an issue at least in our sample.
Table 3. Explaining skill-selective immigration policies (2) (standard errors in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Si,t1 0.896
***
(0.031)
SPILLOVER2i,t1 0.989
*** 1.112 *** 1.112 *** 0.172 ***
(0.029) (0.068) (0.072) (0.044)
ln yi,t1 -0.045 -0.011 -0.011
*** 0.019
(0.237) (0.197) (0.170) (0.077)
constant 0.474 -0.262 0.008 *** -0.705
(2.436) (1.872) (1.458) (0.655)
Observations 390 390 390 375
Country-specific fixed effects no yes yes yes
Time-specific fixed effects no no yes no
R2 0.75 0.55 0.55 0.91
Note: ***,**,* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. The dependent variable is
the index of skill-selective immigration policies, Sit, in all regressions. Regression (1) is estimated by pooled
OLS. Regression (2) is estimated with country-specific fixed effects. The F(14, 373) -test statistic is 130.71***
which rejects the Null of no country-specific effects at the 1 percent level. Regression (3) is estimated with
country- and time-specific fixed effects. The F(24, 348)-test statistic in regression (3) is 0.83, suggesting that
the time-specific fixed effects are not significant. Regression (4) is estimated with country-specific fixed effects
but no time-specific fixed effects, since the F(24, 333)-test statistic of 0.85 indicates that time-specific fixed
effects are not significant. We report panel corrected standard errors assuming panel-specific heteroscedas-
ticity of the standard errors in regressions (3) and (4). In regression (3), the Wald-2(41) statistics for the
model assuming independent errors is 8.944 and for the model assuming heteroscedastic errors it is 19.456.
In regression (4), the Wald-2(17) statistics for the model assuming independent errors is 47.432 and for the
model assuming heteroscedastic errors it is 57.159.
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Conclusion
In this article we present a simple model which analyses the political economy of a
selective immigration policy, which tries to screen migrants by human capital cri-
teria. We ﬁnd that a selective immigration policy which regulates migration by
human capital criteria yields a higher number of migrants compared to countries
which do not opt for a selective immigration policy, and it reduces the number of
migrants in countries which do not adopt a screening of migrants. Finally, our
theoretical framework suggests policy contagion, as ‘not adopting’ a selective
immigration policy is not a sensible strategy since countries can improve their
welfare if they opt for a screening of migrants – given that other countries have
started to screen migrants.
We derive two testable hypotheses from these theoretical consideration: ﬁrst,
countries with a selective immigration policy will admit more migrants and, second,
the application of a selective immigration policy in one country increases the prob-
ability that other countries, particularly in the same geographical area, will adopt
the same approach. We tested both propositions with the help of regression models
in 15 OECD countries during the period 1980 to 2005. We ﬁnd (i) that countries
with a higher degree of skill-selective immigration policies measured by our policy
index have a signiﬁcantly higher net immigration rate, and (ii) that skill-selective
immigration policies are closely correlated with countries which are substitutes as
destinations for migrants.
There are a number of implications from these ﬁndings. Firstly, given the pres-
ence of policy contagion, our results hint at the opportunity for welfare improving
policy coordination, i.e. internalizing the externality that independently conducted
migration policies impose. Secondly, we have demonstrated that the risk of conta-
gion, and hence the potential for beneﬁcial coordination, are largest in regional
clusters; thus, interpreted in the European context, our results suggest that EU
wide migration policies could potentially resolve the contagion issue. Thirdly, our
theoretical model emphasizes the role of informational asymmetries and the impor-
tance of the screening technology. It follows immediately that too simplistic screen-
ing tools and entry tests come at a cost, namely they reduce the potential beneﬁts of
migration that a country can harvest.
We would like to add a ﬁnal remark that our ﬁndings are robust in diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the regression models, i.e. under consideration of country- and
time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and in static as well as in dynamic speciﬁcations – con-
trolling for various other factors. However, since the variance of immigration pol-
icies is relatively low in our sample, we suggest that our results are interpreted with
caution. Even though we ﬁnd correlations which support our theoretical predic-
tions, and even though we include lagged policy variables, we still hesitate to draw
conclusive causal inference from this evidence. In our view these ﬁndings are,
however, a strong ﬁrst hint that migration regulation contagion exists.
Moreover, our model and empirical results imply that skill-selective immigration
policies should be on the rise, and indeed be the rule rather than an exception.
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Yet, we do observe countries with no or only soft skill-selective migration policies.
Hence, some counterbalancing beneﬁt of soft polices or the cost of strict policies –
not captured in the present article – must be in place. Future research will have to
address these issues.
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Notes
1. Notice that the literature distinguishes migrants – the research focus of the current
article – from asylum seekers and refugees.
2. The only example we are aware of is Bertoli et al. (2009: Chapter 7) which addresses the
question of whether skill-selective immigration can result in a ‘Tragedy of the
Commons’, i.e. whether the increasing competition for high skilled immigrants might
eventually exhaust the global pool of skilled labour. In contrast, we address the ques-
tion of whether for a given pool of skilled labour skill-selective immigration policies in
one country reduce the average skill-level of the immigrant population in another
country.
3. In fact, the two countries each face a linear programming problem, with a simple
maximand, one constraint and the usual extreme point solutions. As will become
clear below, the two programming problems will become inter-related via the effect
on the migrant pool.
4. Notice that the above government objective functions are independent on all accounts
except for the common resource pool, so we depart from traditional Nash strategic
interaction settings.
5. We are grateful to Anna Maria Mayda and Giovanni Peri for providing information
and access to their data sets. The included countries are: Australia (AUS), Belgium (BE),
Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Japan (JAP), Luxemburg
(LX), The Netherlands (NL), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Sweden (SWE),
Switzerland (SWI), United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (USA).
6. For an overview on skill-selective immigration policies in the OECD, see also Bertoli
et al. (2009), Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009) and Mayda and Patel (2004).
7. Note that the R2 statistic of the pooled and the fixed effects model are not comparable
since the first refers to the overall variance in the data and the second to the within
variance.
8. The long-term coefficients of the dynamic model refer to the long-run equilibrium of the
model which is achieved after the adjustment to economic shocks has been completed.
The long-run coefficients of the model are calculated as x ¼ x=ð1
PN
j¼1 j Þ, where x
denotes the long-term coefficient of an explanatory variable x and ax the short-term
coefficient.
9. Population size turns out to be insignificant in all regressions explaining skill-selective
immigration policies carried out by us.
10. As before, the long-term coefficients of the dynamic model are calculated as
	x ¼ 	x=ð1
PN
j¼1 j Þ, where 	x denotes the long-term coefficient of an explanatory
variable x and bx the short-term coefficient.
Bru¨cker and Schro¨der 333
 at Inst Fuer Arbeitsmarkt-Und on September 10, 2013eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
References
Appleyard R (2001) International migration policies: 1950–2000. International Migration
39(6): 7–20.
Baldwin RE and Wyplosz C (2005) The Economics of European Integration. McGraw-Hill.
Beck N and Katz J (1995) What to do (and not to do) with cross-section time series data.
American Political Science Review 89(3): 634–647.
Beck N and Katz J (1996) Nuisance vs. substance: Specifying and estimating time-series-
cross-section models. Political Analysis 6(1): 1–36.
Belot M and Hatton T (2008) Immigrant selection in the OECD. CEPR Working Paper No.
6675.
Bertoli S, Bru¨cker H, Facchini G, Mayda AM and Peri G (2009) The battle for brains: How
to attract talent. Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti. www.frdb.orgMilano.
Blanchflower DG and Oswald AJ (2004) Money, sex, and happiness: An empirical study.
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(3): 393–415.
Boeri T and Bru¨cker H (2005) Why are Europeans so tough on migrants? Economic Policy
44: 629–703.
Boeri T, Hanson G and McCormick B (2002) Immigration and the Welfare State. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bonin H, Raffelhu¨schen B and Walliser J (2000) Can immigration alleviate the demographic
burden? FinanzArchiv 57: 1–21.
Bru¨cker H and Defoort C (2009) Inequality and the self-selection of migrants: Theory and
evidence. International Journal of Manpower 30(7): 742–760.
Bru¨cker H and Schro¨der PJH (2011) International migration with heterogeneous agents:
Theory and evidence for Germany, 1967–2009. The World Economy 34: (in press).
Chaloff J and Lemaitre G (2009) Managing highly skilled labour migration: A comparative
analysis of migration policies and challenges in OECD countries. OECD Social,
Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 79.
Dixit A and Norman V (1980) Theory of International Trade. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
Dover R (2008) Towards a common EU immigration policy: A securitization too far.
Journal of European Integration 30(1): 113–130.
Facchini G and Mayda AM (2008) From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration
policy outcomes: Theory and evidence. Economic Policy 56: 651–713.
Facchini G and Mayda AM (2009) Does the welfare state affect individual attitudes towards
immigrants? Evidence across countries. Review of Economics and Statistics 91(2): 295–314.
Facchini G, Mayda AM and Mishra P (2008) Do interest groups affect US immigration
policy? CEPR Working Paper No. 6898.
Freeman GP (1992) Migration policy and politics in the receiving states. International
Migration Review 26(4): 1144–1167.
Freeman GP (1995) Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states. International
Migration Review 29(4): 881–902.
Freeman R (2006) People flows in globalization. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2):
145–170.
Grogger J and Hanson GH (2008) Income maximization and the selection and sorting of
international migrants. NBER Working Paper No. 13821.
Hainmueller J and HiscoxMJ (2010) Attitudes towards highly skilled and low skilled immigra-
tion: Evidence from a survey experiment. American Political Science Review 104(1): 1–24.
334 European Union Politics 12(3)
 at Inst Fuer Arbeitsmarkt-Und on September 10, 2013eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Heston A, Summers R and Aten B (2009) Penn World Table Version 6.3. Center for inter-
national comparisons of production, income and prices at the University of
Pennsylvania, August 2009.
Hooghe M, Trappers A, Meuleman B and Reeskens T (2008) Migration to European
countries: A structural explanation of patterns, 1980–2004. International Migration
Review 42(2): 476–504.
Judson RA and Owen AL (1999) Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide for
Macroeconomists. Economics Letters 65(1): 9–15.
Kato J (2003) Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependence and Policy
Diffusion. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Koff H (2005) Security, markets and power: The relationship between EU enlargement and
immigration. Journal of European Integration 27(4): 397–415.
Mayda AM (2006) Who is against immigration? A cross country investigation of individual
attitudes towards immigrants. Review of Economics and Statistics 88(3): 510–530.
Mayda AM (2007) International migration flows: An analysis of the forces and constraints at
work. Mimeo, Washington DC: Georgetown University.
Mayda AM and Patel K (2004) OECD countries migration policy changes, Unpublished
manuscript. Available at http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/amm223/papers.htm.
Neumayer E (2004) Asylum destination choice – what makes some West European countries
more attractive than others? European Union Politics 5(2): 155–180.
Neumayer E and Plu¨mper T (2010) Spatial effects in dyadic data. International Organization
64(1): 145–166.
New Zealand Home Office. (2010) Immigration Policies in New Zealand. Available at http://
www.homeoffice.nz.
Nickell S (1981) Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica 49(6): 1417–1426.
OECD (2003) New Zealand: Economic Survey. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2009) OECD STAT Database. Paris: OECD. Available at http://www.oecd.org.
Ortega F (2005) Immigration quotas and skill upgrading. Journal of Public Economics 89(9–
10): 1841–1863.
Ortega F and Peri G (2009) The causes and effects of international migrations: Evidence from
OECD countries 1980–2005. NBER Working Paper No. 14833.
Razin A, Sadka E and Suwankiri B (2009) Migration and the welfare state: Dynamic poli-
tical-economy theory. NBER Working Paper No. 14784.
Shipan CR and Volden C (2006) Bottom-up federalism: The diffusion of antismoking pol-
icies from U.S. cities to states. American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 825–843.
Shipan CR and Volden C (2008) The mechanisms of policy diffusion. American Journal of
Political Science 52(4): 840–857.
Simmons BA and Elkins Z (2004) The globalization of liberalization: Policy diffusion in the
international political economy. American Political Science Review 98(1): 171–189.
Venturini A (2007) Postwar Migration in Southern Europe, 1950–2000. Cambridge MA:
Cambridge University Press.
Volden C, Ting MM and Carpenter DP (2008) A formal model of learning and policy
diffusion. American Political Science Review 102(3): 319–332.
World Bank (2010) World Development Indicators 2010. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wong, KY (1995) International Trade in Goods and Factor Mobility. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Bru¨cker and Schro¨der 335
 at Inst Fuer Arbeitsmarkt-Und on September 10, 2013eup.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
